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COMPARISON WITH THE EFFECTS OF PARTY DIFFERENCES ON CONGRESSIONAL VOTING SUGGESTS THAT PARTY-RELATED LIBERALISM OR CONSERVATISM ON THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS MAY VARY OVER TIME. THE PROPOSITION THAT PARTISAN DIFFERENCES IN DISTRICT COURTS WILL INCREASE DURING PERIODS OF SUPREME COURT AMBIGUITY IS TESTED BY CORRELATING PARTY PREFERENCE TO CIVIL LIBERALISM FOR EACH YEAR FROM 1960 TO 1976.

DELEGATION OF DISCRETION OVER ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION TO THE STATES MAY TRIGGER A PROCESS ANALOGUS TO GRESHAM'S LAW IN WHICH LAX REGULATION IN ONE STATE DRIVES OUT STRINGENT REGULATION IN NEIGHBORING STATES. LAX PESTICIDE REGULATIONS IN FIVE STATES ILLUSTRATES THIS POINT. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S COMMITMENT TO REDUCE THE STRINGENCY OF REGULATION IS QUESTIONED.

THIS STUDY ANALYZES THE IMPACT THAT PRESIDENTS CAN HAVE ON THE DECISIONAL OUTPUT OF THEIR APPOINTEES TO THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS. PRESIDENTIAL IMPACT MAY BE INFLUENCED BY A NUMBER OF FACTORS: THE EXECUTIVE'S DESIRE TO BASE APPOINTMENTS PRIMARILY ON IDEOLOGICAL CRITERIA; THE NUMBER OF JUDGES HE IS PERMITTED TO APPOINT; THE DEGREE TO WHICH HE CAN USE HIS POLITICAL SKILLS IN SUPPORT OF HIS NOMINEES; AND THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL CLIMATE INTO WHICH THE NEW JUDGES ENTER. THE EMPIRICAL DATA COMPILED ON THE VOTING BEHAVIOR OF THE VARIOUS PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTEES DEMONSTRATES THAT FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGES APPOINTED BY DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTS WERE COMPARATIVELY MORE LIBERAL THAN THOSE CHOSEN BY REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTS. THE FINDINGS ALSO INDICATE THAT POLITICALLY POWERFUL PRESIDENTS WHO SHOWED A PERSONAL INTEREST IN THEIR DISTRICT COURT SELECTIONS HAD A GREATER IMPACT ON THE JUDICIARY THAN PRESIDENTS WHO LACKED THE WILL, THE OPPORTUNITY OR THE POWER TO PACK THE JUDICIARY.

THIS STUDY ANALYZES OPINIONS PUBLISHED BY FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGES IN WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND RACIAL MINORITY DISCRIMINATION CASES IN THE PERIOD 1971-1977. OUR ANALYSIS REVEALED THAT THE PETITIONER IN WOMEN'S RIGHTS CASES WAS ONLY SLIGHTLY MORE LIKELY TO BE VICTORIOUS THAN LITIGANTS FROM OTHER DISADVANTAGED GROUPS. WE FOUND NO SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN JUDGES DECIDING WOMEN'S RIGHTS CASES. THE JUDGE'S POLITICAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION PROVED TO BE AN IMPORTANT VARIABLE, AND A MEANINGFUL SPLIT WAS FOUND TO EXIST BETWEEN DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN JURISTS IN WOMEN'S RIGHTS DECISIONS.

USING COHORT ANALYSIS, THIS STUDY ADDRESSES THIS PRIMARY QUESTION: WHAT ARE THE RELATIVE EFFECTS OF APPOINTING PRESIDENT, MATURATION, AND TIME PERIOD ON U.S. TRIAL JUDGES' VOTING BEHAVIOUR ON CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES CASES? SPECIFICALLY, THE AUTHORS MEASURE THE RELATIVE IMPACT OF THESE VARIABLES ON THE LIBERALISM OF KENNEDY, JOHNSON, AND NIXON APPOINTEES TO THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS. THE DATA FOR THE STUDY ARE 4,553 OPINIONS ISSUED BY THESE THREE PRESIDENTS BETWEEN 1969 AND 1976 THAT WERE PUBLISED IN THE FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT. IN PART, THE STUDY REVEALS THAT THE EFFECTS OF APPOINTING-PRESIDENT COHORTS ARE MUCH STRONGER THAN THE INFLUENCE OF MATURATION OR TIME PERIOD. THE AUTHOR ALSO FOUND THAT THE KENNEDY AND NIXON COHORTS HAVE REMAINED RELATIVELY STABLE OVER TIME AND UNAFFECTED BY MATURATION EFFECTS. THE JOHNSON COHORT, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY MORE LIBERAL ACROSS TIME, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE ADVENT OF THE BURGER COURT.